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1STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Jeffery Jeske contends that the district court erred in several respects in this case:  by
admitting evidence that he refused to consent to a blood draw in violation of his Fourth
Amendment rights; by allowing the State to amend the information on the morning of trial when
doing so prejudiced his rights to adequate notice and a preliminary hearing; by refusing to give
his requested jury instruction regarding the degree of proof the State needed to meet on one of
the theories it was pursuing; and by admitting otherwise-inadmissible propensity evidence under
an improper res gestae analysis.  The State makes several responses to these arguments, none of
which are meritorious.  Many are contrary to established precedent, while others are inconsistent
with the facts of this case.
As a result of the district court’s errors, either independently or cumulatively, this Court
should vacate the judgment of conviction and remand this case for a new trial.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Mr. Jeske’s Appellant’s Brief.  They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are
incorporated herein by reference thereto.
2ISSUES
I. Whether the district court allowed evidence of Mr. Jeske’s refusal to consent to a blood
draw in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights and in direct contravention of clear
Idaho Supreme Court precedent.
II. Whether the district court erred by granting the State’s motion to amend the information
on the morning of trial because doing so prejudiced Mr. Jeske’s constitutional rights to
due process and a preliminary hearing.
III. Whether the district court erred by refusing to give the requested instruction that, to be
guilty  of  DUI  under  an  impairment  theory,  the  impairment  must  be  “noticeable”  or
“perceptible.”
IV. Whether  the  district  court  erred  when  it  allowed  the  State  to  present  evidence  of  other
uncharged misconduct under a res gestae analysis since that evidence is not admissible
under the Rules of Evidence.
V. Whether the accumulation of errors in this case requires reversal even if this Court
determines them all to be individually harmless.
3ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Allowed Evidence Of Mr. Jeske’s Refusal To Consent To A Blood Draw In
Violation Of His Fourth Amendment Rights And In Direct Contravention Of Clear Idaho
Supreme Court Precedent
Mr. Jeske contends that the district court erred by admitting evidence of his refusal to
submit to a blood draw.1  The  State  concedes  that  the  admission  of  a  defendant’s  refusal  to
consent to a blood draw likely violates his Fourth Amendment rights.  (See Resp. Br., p.12.)  As
such, the State only raises a procedural challenge as to whether this issue was properly preserved
for appeal.  (Resp. Br., pp.8-11.)  That argument is meritless because the district court expressly
discussed this issue with counsel before ruling adverse to Mr. Jeske’s position on that issue.
A. The  District  Court’s  Decision  To  Admit  Mr.  Jeske’s  Refusal  To  Consent  To  A  Blood
Draw Is Properly Raise On Appeal
1. Defense counsel’s argument and the district court’s decision regarding the
admissibility of Mr. Jeske’s refusal preserved this issue for appeal
The Idaho Supreme Court has made it clear that, when the issue in question “was directly
addressed by the trial court below, we will decide this issue on appeal.” State v. DuValt, 131
Idaho 550, 53 (1998).  This is because “[t]his Court recognizes a distinction between issues not
formally raised and issues that ‘never surfaced’ below.” Kolar v. Cassia County, Idaho, 142
Idaho 346, 354 (2005); accord Manookian v. Blaine County, 112 Idaho 697, 700 (1987) (holding
1 To be clear, as argued in the Appellant’s Brief at page 6, the district court’s decision to admit
Mr. Jeske’s refusal is an abuse of discretion because that decision is “directly contrary” to the
applicable legal standard articulated in State v. Christiansen, 144 Idaho 463, 470 (2007). See
State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600 (1989) (indicating that a decision which is inconsistent with
the applicable legal standards fails on the second step of the applicable test for abuse of
discretion).
4that when an issue “was implicitly before the Board of County Commissioners, and was
considered and passed upon by [them] . . . , the issue is appropriately considered by the district
court” in its appellate capacity).  As a result, issues which were discussed and ruled on below,
even if they were not formally raised, are properly considered on appeal. See State v. Griffin,
122 Idaho 733, 739 (1992) (citing Manookian, 112 Idaho at 700) (explaining that, even though
the defendant had not included a particular argument in his motions for reduction of sentence, the
Court would still consider his argument in that regard on appeal because he had actually
presented that argument at a hearing below and the district court ruled on it).
In this case, the issue of Mr. Jeske’s refusal to submit to the blood draw was expressly
addressed by the district court and discussed by the parties.  Specifically, the district court asked
both  counsel:   “So  I’d  like  from  both  of  you  some  idea  on  the  case  law  on  the  refusal.   [The
prosecutor] said that there was case law indicating that refusal to perform FSTs or breathalyzer
or submit blood showed  consciousness  of  guilt.   Do  you  have  something  to  cite  to  me?   And
same to you, [defense counsel].”  (Tr., Vol.2, p.20, L.24 - p.21, L.5 (emphasis added).)  Defense
counsel’s response to the district court’s question challenged the admission of all three refusals:
“the refusal cannot be -- the refusal to have a search is within his constitutional rights to refuse
any search  that  was  warrantless,  and  there  can  be  no  mention  of  this  refusal  in  court,  as  it[’]s
prejudicial to that exercise of his constitutional rights.”2  (Tr., Vol.2, p.23, Ls.13-18.)  After
hearing counsel’s arguments, the district court expressly ruled that Mr. Jeske’s refusal to submit
to the blood draw would be admissible:  “I am going to deny the motion [to suppress]. . . . [T]he
2 As the State notes, while field sobriety tests and breath tests are searches, both have been held
to be reasonable searches when an officer is investigation a potential DUI, and so, commenting
on the refusal to consent to those searches does not implicate the Fourth Amendment.  (See Resp.
Br., p.12.)
5refusal to engage in the field sobriety test, the breathalyzer, and to submit to the blood draw goes
to consciousness of guilt.”3  (Tr., Vol.2, p.24, Ls.5-9 (emphasis added).)
The fact that this issue was specifically discussed by the parties and ruled on by the
district court makes this case markedly different from the situation the Idaho Supreme Court
recently faced in State v. Garcia-Rodriguez, 162 Idaho 271, ___, 396 P.3d 700, 704 (2017).  (See
Resp. Br., pp.10-11.)  In Garcia-Rodriguez, the issue had not been discussed at all in the district
court. Id. (“the State failed to advance this argument below”).  Because the issue had never
surfaced in Garcia-Rodriguez, that issue could not be raised for the first time on appeal. See id.;
compare Kolar, 142 Idaho at 354 (reiterating that there is a difference between issues which
were discussed, but not formally raised, below, and those which “never surfaced” below).
Unlike the State in Garcia-Rodriguez,  Mr.  Jeske  forwarded  an  argument  against  the
admission of his refusals to submit to various tests, including the blood draw.  (Tr., Vol.2, p.20,
L.24 - p.23, L.22.)  After hearing those arguments, the district court expressly ruled on that issue
adverse to Mr. Jeske’s position.  (Tr., Vol.2, p.24, Ls.5-9.)  Therefore, this case is governed by
DuValt and Griffin, not Garcia-Rodriguez.  Under DuValt, et al., the issue of whether the district
3 Because trial counsel had argued all three refusals should be suppressed, the district court’s
decision that the refusal to submit to the blood draw would be admissible was not superfluous to
its  ruling on Mr. Jeske’s motion.  (See Resp. Br., p.11 n.6 (citing State v. Abdullah, 158 Idaho
386, 482-83 (2015).)  In fact, the reason the ruling in Abdullah was considered superfluous was
that the defendant had expressly withdrawn the request upon which the district court purported to
rule. Abdullah, 158 Idaho at 482; see also State v. Garcia-Rodriguez, 162 Idaho 271, ___, 396
P.3d 700, 704 (2017) (refusing to consider an issue for the first time on appeal when the
proponent had not actually made an argument on that point below).  However in this case, where
defense counsel continued to argue against the admission of all three refusals, the issue was not
withdrawn, and so, the district court’s ruling that all three refusals would be admissible was not
superfluous.
6court  erred  in  admitting  the  evidence  of  Mr.  Jeske’s  refusal  to  participate  in  the  blood  draw is
properly considered on this appeal.
2. Even if this issue were not preserved below, the district court’s decision to admit
Mr. Jeske’s refusal constitutes fundamental error
Even if the State is correct and this argument needs to be evaluated as fundamental error,
the error is still reversible. See State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 226 (2010) (articulating the
standard for fundamental error review).  On the first prong of that test, the State has conceded
that introducing evidence of Mr. Jeske’s refusal to submit to a blood draw likely violated one of
his unwaived constitutional rights.  (Resp. Br., p.12.)
On the second prong of that test, the error is clear from the record because the violation is
clear from the district court’s ruling that evidence regarding Mr. Jeske’s refusal to consent to a
blood draw would be admissible during his trial and the subsequent presentation of that evidence
to  the  jury.   (See Tr., Vol.2, p.24, Ls.5-9 (the district court’s decision); Tr., Vol.4, p.80,
L.23 - p.81, L.4 (the officer testifying about Mr. Jeske’s refusal); Tr. Vol.4, p.84, Ls.19-24 (the
prosecutor publishing the video showing Mr. Jeske’s refusal); Trial Exhibit 1, Clip 1068014.)
No additional facts are required to assess the propriety of the district court’s decision in that
regard.  The State does not actually contest this point.  (See generally Resp. Br., pp.12-13.)
Rather, the State contends that the error is not clear because it asserts the law is no longer
clearly in Mr. Jeske’s favor.  (Resp. Br., pp.12-13.)  However, the Idaho Supreme Court has
expressly rejected that precise argument and abrogated the cases upon which the State relies:
“This Court has not held that for fundamental error to exist, it is necessary for existing
authorities to have unequivocally resolved the issue in appellant’s favor.  This Court has
examined whether additional evidence is required from the record.  The alleged violation is clear
7from the record, and additional facts are not required for analysis.” State v. Easley, 156 Idaho
214, 221 (2014)) (emphasis in original) (internal citations and footnote (identifying the now-
abrogated Court of Appeals’ decisions to the contrary) omitted).  Therefore, the State’s argument
on the second prong is improper.  Under the proper standard, this error is clear from the record.
On  the  third  prong  of  that  test,  there  is  a  reasonable  possibility  the  evidence  regarding
Mr. Jeske’s refusal to consent to a blood draw affected the outcome of the trial.   The problem
with admitting this sort of evidence is that the jurors may disregard reasonable doubts about the
evidence because they think the defendant is trying to hide his guilt by exercising his rights.
State v. Christiansen, 144 Idaho 463, 470 (2007).  That risk is present in Mr. Jeske’s case.
Under the impairment theory, the State was required to prove that Mr. Jeske’s ability to
drive was noticeably or perceptibly impaired. State v. Schmoll, 144 Idaho 800, 804 (Ct. App.
2007).  There are substantial questions about whether Mr. Jeske was noticeably or perceptibly
impaired.   (See, e.g., App. Br., p.15 (detailing the points in the video where the district court
found  that,  despite  the  officer’s  testimony,  several  particular  signs  of  impairment  were  not
perceptible).)  Therefore, there is a reasonable possibility the jurors disregarded similar
reasonable doubts and inferred Mr. Jeske’s guilt based on his exercise of his rights.  The fact that
the State was also allowed to pursue a per se theory does not change this analysis because, where
the verdict could be based on two different analyses and one of those analyses is improper, the
case must be remanded for a new trial. State v. Luke, 134 Idaho 294, 301 (2000).  Thus, there is
a reasonable possibility this error affected the outcome of the trial as required by the third prong
of Perry.
As a result, even if this error was not preserved, it still amounts to fundamental error.
8B. The  District  Court’s  Decision  To Admit  Evidence  Of  Mr.  Jeske’s  Refusal  Violated  His
Fourth Amendment Rights
Since the State makes no argument about the merits of Mr. Jeske’s argument on this
issue, he simply refers the Court back to pages 5-6 of his Appellant’s Brief.
C. The State Failed To Argue The Proper Standard For Harmless Error, And So, It Failed To
Meet Its Burden To Prove This Error Harmless
In its argument under the fundamental error standard, the State asserts that any error in
this regard was “harmless” based on the other evidence in the record.  (Resp. Br., pp.13-14.)
While this may appear to invoke the harmless error doctrine, it actually does not because the
harmless error test is different than the test for prejudice under the fundamental error test.  When,
as here, the error was preserved, the State bears the burden to prove there is no reasonable
possibility that the error did not contribute to the verdict. Perry, 150 Idaho at 227.  Since the
State did not make any direct argument under the applicable test, this Court should not consider
this issue under the harmless error doctrine. State v. Almaraz, 154 Idaho 584, 598-99 (2011)
(holding that, where “there is no direct argument on this point in the State’s brief,” the State
failed to meet its burden to prove the error harmless).
Even if this Court does consider the harmless error doctrine, the State has still failed to
carry its burden.  In fact, its argument – that the verdict can be upheld based on the other
evidence in the record – has been expressly rejected by the United States Supreme Court:  “The
inquiry, in other words, is not whether, in a trial that occurred without the error, a guilty verdict
surely would have been rendered,” because “to hypothesize a guilty verdict that was never in fact
rendered—no matter how inescapable the findings to support that verdict might be—would
violate the jury-trial guarantee.” Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993); accord Perry,
150 Idaho at 227 (adopting this as the proper standard for objected-to error in Idaho).  The proper
9question is “whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to
the error.” Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 279 (emphasis from original); accord Perry, 150 Idaho at 227.
Furthermore, where the jury could have reached it verdict by using one of two potential analyses,
it is not possible to determine which analysis the jurors used. State v. Luke, 134 Idaho 294, 301
(2000).  Thus, if one of those two analyses is improper, “this court must vacate the conviction
and remand the case for a new trial.” See id. (emphasis added).
The verdict actually rendered cannot be said to be “surely unattributable” to the
improperly-admitted evidence of Mr. Jeske’s refusal to consent to the blood draw because there
is a reasonable possibility it affected the jurors’ analysis on the impairment theory.  Specifically,
they could have harbored reasonable doubts about whether the State’s evidence showed
noticeable or perceptible impairment.  (See App. Br., p.15 (detailing points in the video where,
despite the officer’s testimony, the district court found several particular signs of impairment
were not perceptible).)  As such, there is a reasonable possibility the jurors disregarded those
reasonable doubts and inferred Mr. Jeske’s guilt based on his exercise of his Fourth Amendment
rights. See Christiansen, 144 Idaho at 470.  As a result, there is a reasonable possibility that this
error affected the analysis on one of the two potential theories underlying the verdict in this case.
Since  the  verdict  is  not  clear  as  to  which  of  the  prosecution  theories  the  jury  used  to  reach  its
verdict (see R,  p.202),  there  is  a  reasonable  possibility  that  error  contributed  to  the  verdict
actually rendered in this case. See Luke, 134 Idaho at 301.  As a result, error was not harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt.
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II.
The District Court Erred By Granting The State’s Motion To Amend The Information On The
Morning Of Trial Because Doing So Prejudiced Mr. Jeske’s Constitutional Rights To Due
Process And A Preliminary Hearing
Mr. Jeske contends that the last-minute amendment to the information prejudiced his
constitutional rights to adequate notice of, and a preliminary hearing on, the newly-alleged facts
in that amendment.4  The State does not challenge Mr. Jeske’s point that the elements of the per
se theory of DUI liability requires proof of different facts than those under the impairment
theory.   (See generally Resp. Br., pp.15-22.)  Rather, it argues that no additional notice or a
preliminary hearing was required in this case because both theories ultimately charge DUI, and
so, the late amendment did not change the nature of the offense charged.  (Resp. Br., pp.16-17.)
That argument, which focuses on the designation of the offense, is directly contrary to Idaho
Supreme Court precedent, which has long held:  “‘the facts alleged rather than the designation of
the offense, control[s]’” the scope of the information. State v. O’Neill, 118 Idaho 244, 249
(1990) (quoting State v. Mickey, 27 Idaho 626, ___, 150 P. 39, 40 (1915)).  Therefore, under the
proper rule, the State’s arguments are meritless.
4 To be clear, as Mr. Jeske acknowledged in his Appellant’s Brief, the question of whether to
allow an amendment to the information is subject to the district court’s discretion, and the legal
standards in this particular regard require that the amendment not prejudice his substantial rights.
(See App.  Br.,  p.10.)   Since  the  amendment  in  this  case  did  prejudice  several  of  his  state  and
federal constitutional rights, the district court’s decision is inconsistent with the applicable legal
standards, and thus, constitutes an abuse of its discretion. See Hedger, 115 Idaho at 600.  The
underlying question regarding the scope of the two informations is, of course, a question of law
subject to free review. See, e.g., State v. Quintero, 141 Idaho 619, 621 (2005) (explaining that,
whether the information meets the legal requirements is subject to free review).
11
A. Mr. Jeske Did Not Have Adequate Notice Of The State’s Intent To Use The BAC Test
Results Prior To The Amendment To The Information
The Idaho Supreme Court has long since explained that the constitutional right to notice
focuses on whether there is “a statement of the acts constituting the offense in ordinary and
concise language, and in such manner as to enable a person of common understanding to know
what is intended” in the charging document. State v. McMahan, 57 Idaho 240, ___, 65 P.2d 156,
159-60 (1937) (internal quotation omitted) (emphasis from original).  Using the proper analysis,
the only facts alleged in the initial information in Mr. Jeske’s case spoke to the impairment
theory of DUI liability.  (See R., p.56.)  In fact, the prosecutor admitted that, because she did not
have the BAC test results at that time, she intentionally chose to limit the scope of information to
the theory which did not require her to use the BAC test results.  (R., p.143 (“In order to timely
file the Information . . . the State alleged this offense under one theory:  operating a vehicle while
under the influence”).)  As a result, when the prosecutor sought to amend the information to also
charge the per se theory,  she  had  to  allege  new facts  –  Mr.  Jeske’s  BAC level  at  the  time his
blood was drawn.  (See R., pp.149-50.)
Because the amendment changed the facts Mr. Jeske would have to defend against, and
because he was forced to immediately defend against them, he was denied the benefit of the right
to notice – he did not have sufficient time to prepare a proper defense to those new facts.
See State v. Gumm, 99 Idaho 549, 551-52 (1978) (identifying the ability to prepare a proper
defense  as  one  of  the  things  the  right  to  notice  is  meant  to  protect).   Because  Mr.  Jeske  was
denied the benefit of his right to adequate notice, the amendment prejudiced that substantial
right.
The State tries to overcome that conclusion by arguing that, because Mr. Jeske had the
BAC test results prior to trial, his ability to prepare a defense was not hindered by the late
12
amendment.  (Resp. Br., pp.17-19.)  However, the focus of the State’s argument again fails to
appreciate the proper standard.  The question is not whether the defense was aware that the facts
existed, but is, instead, whether the defense was aware of the prosecutor’s intent to use those
facts at trial. See, e.g., State v. Dorsey, 139 Idaho 149, 152 (Ct. App. 2003) (finding no due
process violation because “Dorsey was given notice of how the State intended to present its case,
and the evidence which had to be refuted at trial”) (emphasis added); cf. State v. Sheldon, 145
Idaho 225, 230 (2007) (holding that the admission of evidence was improper under I.R.E. 404(b)
when the prosecution had not provided “timely notice of its intent to use” the evidence in
question) (emphasis added).
This rule is evident, for example, in State v. LaMere, where the fact at issue (the victim’s
age) was discussed during the preliminary hearing and during plea negotiations in regard to a
possible plea to statutory rape. State v. LaMere, 103 Idaho 839, 842 (1982).  Thus, the reason
there was no notice problem in subsequently amending the information to include that fact was
that those pretrial discussions had made the defense aware of the prosecutor’s intent to use that
fact, and so, the defense had been able to prepare a proper defense in that regard. See id.  That
knowledge is actually evident in that case because, “when requesting this amendment the
prosecutor offered to continue the case in order for the defense to further prepare, but that offer
was declined.” Id.  Thus, the State’s reliance on LaMere for the proposition that knowledge of
the fact itself is enough is misplaced.  (See Resp. Br., pp.17-18.)
Application of the proper rule is also demonstrated in Gumm, where the charge was theft
and the facts added to the information were the specific identity of the property stolen. Gumm,
99 Idaho at 552.  In that case, the defense had been provided a list of the allegedly-stolen
property prior to trial. Id.  In that context, where those facts were the only facts which the State
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could  conceivably  use  to  prove  one  of  the  elements  of  the  charged  offense  at  trial,  the  pretrial
knowledge of those facts necessarily included knowledge that the prosecution intended to present
them. See id.  As a result of the defendant’s knowledge that the prosecutor intended to use those
facts, there was no prejudice in subsequently amending the information to include them. See id.
However, in Mr. Jeske’s case, the BAC test results were not necessary for the State to
meet its burden, as they were irrelevant to the only theory charged in the initial information.
See State v. Robinett, 141 Idaho 110, 113 (2005) (explaining that BAC test results are not
relevant in an impairment theory case unless they are used to extrapolate the defendant’s BAC
level at the time he was driving); State v. Edmonson, 125 Idaho 132, 134 (Ct. App. 1994)
(explaining that evidence relevant to the impairment theory was properly excluded in per se
theory prosecution because it was irrelevant in light of the prosecution’s decision to limit itself to
only one of the two potential theories).  Therefore, unlike Gumm, the pretrial knowledge of those
facts did not inherently include knowledge of the prosecutor’s intent to use those facts at trial.
Cf. Dorsey, 139 Idaho at 151 (explaining that, with multiple-means offenses such as this, simply
repeating the statutory language does not sufficiently inform the defendant of what charge he
must defend against).
Furthermore, the prosecutor’s intent to present that evidence was not revealed in the
pretrial discussions.  For example, there was no preliminary hearing in this case, at which that
intent could have been made apparent. Compare Dorsey, 139 Idaho at 152.  Besides, the
prosecutor admitted she intentionally chose to limit the scope of the initial allegations to only the
impairment  theory.   (R.,  p.143.)   Thus,  the  impression  the  State  gave  at  that  point  was  that  it
would  not  be  using  the  BAC  test  results  at  trial,  since  it  had  affirmatively  decided  to  proceed
only on a theory which did not require it to use those facts.
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Additionally, once the prosecutor received the BAC test results, she did not disclose the
credentials  of  the  person  who  drew  Mr.  Jeske’s  blood  to  the  defense.   (See Tr., Vol.2, p.8,
Ls.14-21.)  Since only certain people with the appropriate training are authorized to draw blood
for BAC testing, I.C. § 18-8003(1), the phlebotomist’s testimony would be required to lay
foundation  to  admit  the  blood,  and  thus,  the  subsequent  test  results,  regardless  of  whether  the
State  disclosed  the  credentials  of  the  person  who  ultimately  tested  that  blood. See I.C.R.
16(b)(6)-(7).  The defense made a written request for disclosure of anticipated expert testimony
at the outset of this case.  (10/25/17 Augmentation, Aug. p.3.)5  As such, the fact that the State
did not disclose the phlebotomist’s credentials reinforced the impression that it was not intending
to use the BAC test results at trial. (Tr., Vol.2, p.9, Ls.20-23.)
Furthermore, during the pretrial motion practice, the State only argued about the facts
relating to the impairment theory, not the BAC test results.  (See generally R., pp.68-70, 121-32;
Tr., Vol.1; Aug. pp.1-2.)  As a result, unlike in LaMere, there is no indication in this case that the
defense was made aware of the prosecutor’s intent to use the otherwise-irrelevant BAC test
results  prior  to  the  amendment  to  the  information.   As  a  result,  Mr.  Jeske’s  knowledge  of  the
BAC test results themselves was not sufficient to satisfy the due process notice requirements.
Therefore, the eleventh-hour amendment to make those facts relevant and admissible, and
then  immediately  force  Mr.  Jeske  to  defend  against  those  new  allegations,  was  prejudicial  to
Mr. Jeske’s constitutional due process right to adequate notice.
5 A motion to augment the record with a copy of the defense’s written discovery request has been
filed contemporaneously with this brief.  As a previous motion to augment has already been
granted, the date of the new motion to augment is provided in the citation to promote clarity.
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B. The Facts On Which Mr. Jeske Was Bound Over Did Not Include His BAC Level,
Meaning He Was Entitled To A Preliminary Hearing On The New Facts Alleged In The
Amended Information
The State’s contention that Mr. Jeske’s right to a preliminary hearing was not prejudiced
by the eleventh-hour amendment also fails to appreciate the facts of this case and the applicable
legal standards.  First, to the State’s point that Mr. Jeske waived his right to a preliminary
hearing (see Resp. Br., pp.21-22), such waivers must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.
See, e.g., Noel v. State, 113 Idaho 92, 93 (Ct. App. 1987).  Mr. Jeske waived his right to a
preliminary hearing based on the factual allegations in the initial information, which, by the
prosecutor’s own admission, were intentionally limited to only the impairment theory.  Thus, his
waiver could not have been knowing or intelligent in regard to uncharged facts which were not
relevant under the only theory that was actually charged.6  As such, that waiver does not prevent
Mr. Jeske from objecting to the lack of a preliminary hearing on the amended information.
Second, the State’s argument regarding State v. Palmer, 138 Idaho 931 (Ct. App. 2003),
fails to appreciate the proper focus of the analysis in that case because it still focuses on the
charging designation.  (See Resp. Br., p.21.)  As Palmer reaffirms, it is the facts alleged, not the
charging designation, which define the scope of the information and reveal whether an
amendment to an information violates the right to a preliminary hearing. See Palmer, 138 Idaho
at 937; see also O’Neill, 118 Idaho at 249-50 (holding no new preliminary hearing was needed
before the defendant pled to an amended information charging a lesser-included offense because
“No different facts were alleged in the Amended Information. . . . O’Neill was not being charged
6 The validity or scope of a waiver is, of course, reviewed de novo. See, e.g., State v. Lindsay,
124 Idaho 825, 828 (Ct. App. 1993) (specifically examining a waiver of the right to counsel).
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with a totally different crime, nor any acts different than those originally alleged”) (emphasis
added).
Thus, in Palmer, the State sought to amend the amount of methamphetamine the
defendant was alleged to have trafficked from 28 grams to 400 grams. Palmer, 138 Idaho at 937.
However, the statute under which the defendant in that case was charged defined the only
relevant fact as trafficking “28 grams or more” of methamphetamine. Id. at 936-37 (punctuation
altered).  Therefore, amending the facts to increase the alleged amount trafficked did not change
the factual allegations relevant to the offense charged; it only affected the potential penalties
available if he were ultimately convicted. Id. at 937.  A change in the allegations which only
affects the potential sentencing options does not affect the right to a preliminary hearing.
See, e.g., State v. Schall, 157 Idaho 488, 492 (2014) (holding a preliminary hearing was not
required when the State sought to add a sentencing enhancement allegation to the charges).
Thus, in Palmer,  where  the  defendant  was  alleged  to  have  trafficked  28  grams  or  more  of
methamphetamine in both the initial and amended informations, the amendment as to exactly
how many grams were involved did not change the facts relevant to the elements of the charged
offense, and so, the amendment did not violate his right to a preliminary hearing since he had
already been bound over on that set of relevant facts. Id.
Unlike the situations in Palmer and O’Neill, the amended information in Mr. Jeske’s case
actually changed the acts alleged from what had been initially charged.  Specifically, the
amendment added the new allegation that Mr. Jeske had been driving with a BAC of greater than
0.08 percent.  (Compare R., p.46 with R., pp.149-50)  Therefore, under the rule used in Palmer
and O’Neill, the amendment changed the nature of the offense alleged in this case even if it did
not change the name of that offense.  As a result, unlike the defendants in those cases, Mr. Jeske
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was constitutionally-entitled to a preliminary hearing on the newly-alleged facts because they
were not included in the allegations on which he had been bound over.  Because he was not
afforded that right, the eleventh-hour amendment prejudiced that right.
Since the amendment to the information prejudiced two of Mr. Jeske’s constitutional
rights, the decision to allow that amendment at the last minute was an abuse of the district court’s
discretion.
III.
The District Court Erred By Refusing To Give The Requested Instruction That, To Be Guilty Of
DUI Under An Impairment Theory, The Impairment Must Be “Noticeable” Or “Perceptible”
Mr. Jeske contends the district court erred by denying his request to instruct the jury as to
the degree of proof required to show actual impairment under the impairment theory – that the
impairment be noticeable or perceptible.7  (See R., p.138.)  A requested instruction should be
given  if  it  is  a  proper  statement  of  the  law,  is  supported  by  a  reasonable  view  of  some  of  the
evidence, is not covered by the other instructions, and does not comment on the evidence.
State v. Macias, 142 Idaho 509, 510 (Ct. App. 2005).  The State does not contest Mr. Jeske’s
analysis on the second or fourth prongs of that test.  (See generally Resp. Br., pp.23-26.)  Rather,
it argues that the proposed instruction did not properly state the law or, alternatively, it was
adequately covered by the other instructions given.  (Resp. Br., pp.23-26.)  The State’s
arguments are mistaken because the former is contrary to the Court of Appeals’ decision in
7 To be clear, as Mr. Jeske indicated in his Appellant’s Brief, the standard for reviewing the
refusal to give a requested jury instruction is an objective one.  (See App. Br., p.14 (quoting
State v. Macias, 142 Idaho 509, 510 (Ct. App. 2005).)  As Macias explains, that standard is
subject to free review, considering whether the instructions as a whole properly set forth the
applicable law.  (See also Resp. Br., p.22 (detailing this particular standard).)
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State v. Schmoll, 144 Idaho 800 (Ct. App. 2007), and the latter is  based on a misreading of the
Court of Appeals’ decision in State v. Lewis, 126 Idaho 282 (Ct. App. 1994).
A. The  Requested  Jury  Instruction  Was  A Proper  Statement  Of  The  Law,  As  It  Has  Been
Reaffirmed In Schmoll
The Court of Appeals has reaffirmed what the law requires under the impairment theory:
“this Court has previously defined what it means to be under the influence in Idaho, and it
includes impairment of driving ability to the slightest degree; the impairment must be noticeable
and perceptible, but does not need to rise to the level where the defendant is incapable of driving
safely or prudently.” Schmoll, 144 Idaho at 804 (stating this as the relevant law in Idaho while
evaluating whether a Montana DUI statute was substantially conforming to Idaho’s DUI statute)
(emphasis added).  This has long been the understanding in Idaho, since “[a]s a practical matter,
however, the state must prove the impairment by observations of some type of ascertainable
conduct or effect.” State v. Andrus, 118 Idaho 711, 715 (Ct. App. 1990).
Given that understanding of the law on the impairment theory, the defendant in Andrus
was properly able to argue that the State had not met its burden to show he was impaired, and the
Court of Appeals found error in the jury instructions because they did not properly define the
degree of proof regarding the alleged impairment. Id. (explaining the jury needed to be
instructed that the State had to prove the ability to drive was impaired).  Like the defendant in
Andrus,  Mr.  Jeske  argued  the  State  failed  to  meet  its  burden  to  show  his  ability  to  drive  was
impaired.  (Tr., Vol.5, p.18, L.20 - p.23, L.5), and he requested an instruction defining the degree
of proof required to show the alleged impairment.  (R., p.138.)  That request mirrored the law as
set forth in Andrus and reaffirmed in Schmoll.   (See R., p.138.)  As such, the requested
instruction was a proper statement of the law.
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B. A Proper Reading Of Lewis Reaffirms That, While Not Required In All Cases, An
Instruction Quantifying The Degree Of Proof Needed Under The Impairment Theory
May Be Proper In Certain Cases, Like Mr. Jeske’s
The State misreads the decision in Lewis, and so, mistakenly argues that Mr. Jeske’s
argument on appeal was rejected when the Court of Appeals explained that a separate instruction
about the degree of proof required under the impairment theory was not “‘mandatory’” in all
impairment-theory prosecutions.8 See Lewis, 126 Idaho at 285 (quoting Andrus, 118 Idaho at
715).  Most notably, the issue in Lewis was not the same as the one Mr. Jeske now argues
because the defendant in Lewis “neither objected to the instruction nor proposed an additional or
different instruction on this subject.” Lewis, 126 Idaho at 284.  Since Mr. Jeske did specifically
request a different instruction in this regard (R., p.138), this case is assessed under the four-prong
test as set forth in Macias, a test which was not at issue in Lewis.
Furthermore, the fact that an instruction such as Mr. Jeske requested may not be required
in every case does not, ipso facto, mean it is an improper instruction in all such cases. See, e.g.,
Stephen M. Rice, Conspicuous Logic: Using the Logical Fallacy of Affirming the Consequent as
a Litigation Tool, 14 BARRY L. REV. 1, 10-12 (2010) (explaining the logical flaw in drawing such
conclusions).  In fact, the State’s argument is disproved by Lewis itself, since the Lewis Court
expressly acknowledged “‘it is not error to further quantify the degree of proof required.’”
Lewis, 126 Idaho at 285 (quoting Andrus, 118 Idaho at 715) (emphasis added).
8 To the extent that Schmoll and Lewis may be inconsistent in this regard, Schmoll should
control, as, for the reasons discussed in Section III(A), supra,  it  is  the  more  sound  of  the  two
decisions, and it is also the more recent. See, e.g., State v. Moad, 156 Idaho 654, 658 n.3
(Ct. App. 2014) (explaining that, where two prior Supreme Court decisions appeared
inconsistent, it would follow the explanation set forth in the more recent opinion); see also
State v. Clinton, 155 Idaho 271, 272 n.1 (2013) (reiterating that the Supreme Court is free to
agree with or reject the reasoning of a prior Court of Appeals’ decision in ruling on a case).
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Basically, what the Court of Appeals has recognized is that, while not every case needs
such an instruction, a case could arise where it would be appropriate to provide more information
about the degree of proof regarding impairment.9 See id.; compare Andrus, 118 Idaho at 715
(exemplifying a case where an instruction further quantifying the degree of proof was needed).
Because of the possibility that such an instruction could be needed in other cases, the Lewis
Court reiterated the guidance the Court of Appeals had previously given as to what such an
additional instruction should provide:  “‘We recommend that if an adjective phrase be used to
describe the degree of impairment required, it be that the impairment is noticeable or
perceptible.’” Id. (quoting Andrus, 118 Idaho at 715).  Therefore, the State’s argument – that
Lewis rejected the argument Mr. Jeske now raises – is mistaken. Lewis actually reaffirmed that
such an instruction could properly be given, provided the facts of the case required it.
Mr. Jeske’s case presents the precise scenario Lewis and Andrus anticipated.  Mr. Jeske
argued that the State had failed to meet its burden to prove he was actually impaired.  (See
Tr., Vol.5, p.18, L.20 - p.23, L.5; see also App. Br., p.15 (detailing several respects in which
there were reasonable doubts about what the State’s evidence showed about Mr. Jeske’s alleged
impairment).)  Therefore, he properly requested the jury instructions inform the jury about the
degree of proof required for the State to show impairment under this statute. Compare Andrus,
118 Idaho at 715.
None of the other instructions quantified the degree of proof required to show the
impairment recognized in Schmoll and Andrus; they simply stated that the ability to drive must
9 For example, a case where the defense was arguing that signs of impairment were actually
caused by a medical condition, as opposed to by alcohol, would probably not need an instruction
like the one Mr. Jeske requested.
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be impaired.  (See R., pp.191, 194.)  As such, Mr. Jeske’s requested instruction was not covered
by the other instructions.  Thus, as a proper statement of the relevant law, which was supported
by a reasonable view of some of the evidence, and which did not improperly comment on that
evidence, the requested instruction needed to be given in this case, even though it might not have
been necessary in other cases. See Macias, 142 Idaho at 510 (explaining that, if a requested
instruction passes the four-prong test, the instruction “must be given) (emphasis added).
C. The  State  Did  Not  Argue  Under  The  Proper  Standard  For  Harmless  Error,  And  So,  It
Failed To Meet Its Burden To Prove This Error Harmless
The State has failed to carry its burden to prove this error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. See Perry, 150 Idaho at 224.  The State’s argument for harmlessness is based
on  two  points  –  that  their  verdict  would  have  been  the  same  because  of  the  evidence  offered
under the per se theory, and that the noticeable or perceptible requirement was addressed by the
other instructions which were given.  (Resp. Br., p.26.)  First, the evidence offered under the per
se theory is irrelevant to the analysis on the impairment theory. See Perry, 150 Idaho at 224; see
also Robinett,  141  Idaho  at  113  (explaining  that  BAC  test  results  are  irrelevant  under  the
impairment theory).  Therefore, the per se theory evidence does not show that the error in the
instructions on the impairment theory was harmless.
In fact, as discussed in Section I(C), supra, such arguments have been deemed improper
by the United States Supreme Court. See Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 279 (explaining that the question
of harmlessness is not whether, absent the error, there is sufficient evidence upon which to find
guilt; the question is whether the verdict actually rendered in this trial was “surely
unattributable” to this error); accord Perry, 150 Idaho at 227 (same).  Regardless of the evidence
on the pro se theory, if the analysis on the impairment theory is flawed, the error is not harmless
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because  it  is  not  possible  to  tell  whether  the  jury  reached  its  verdict  on  a  proper  or  improper
theory. Luke, 134 Idaho at 301.
The analysis under the impairment theory was flawed because rational jurors could have
harbored reasonable doubts about whether the alleged impairment was noticeable or perceptible.
(See App. Br., p.15 (the district court finding several points allegedly showing impairment were
not perceptible in the video, despite the officer’s testimony to the contrary); see also Tr., Vol.5,
p.18, L.20 - p.23, L.5 (defense counsel arguing these points to the jury).)  There is a reasonable
possibility that they disregarded those doubts as irrelevant to the ultimate question asked since
none of the instructions actually addressed the degree of proof required under the law.  (See
Section III(B), supra.)  Since there is a reasonable possibly the failure to properly instruct the
jury as to the degree of proof needed for the State to prove actual impairment contributed to the
verdict actually rendered in this case, this error was not harmless.
IV.
The District Court Erred When It Allowed The State To Present Evidence Of Other Uncharged
Misconduct Under A Res Gestae Analysis Since That Evidence Is Not Admissible Under The
Rules Of Evidence
Mr. Jeske contends the district court erred in admitting evidence of uncharged conduct
based on the rationale that “it is sufficiently intertwined with other issues that it would be -- that
it also goes to reasonable suspicion and probable cause.”10  (Tr., Vol.2, p.24, Ls.14-17.)  The
10 To be clear, as Mr. Jeske indicated in his Appellant’s Brief, to be admissible under
I.R.E. 404(b), evidence of uncharged conduct must be relevant to a non-propensity purpose and
the risk of undue prejudice cannot substantially outweigh that probative value.  (App. Br., p.18
(citing State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 52 (2009)).)  As Grist explains, admission of evidence under
that test is ultimately reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Grist,  147  Idaho  at  51.   Since  the
admission of the evidence in this case was improper under the two-part test, the district court’s
decision is inconsistent with the applicable legal standards, and thus, constitutes an abuse of its
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State does not contest Mr. Jeske’s assertion that the district court’s point about that evidence
“go[ing] to reasonable suspicion and probable cause,” was not a proper basis upon which to
admit evidence of uncharged conduct.  (See generally Resp. Br., pp.28-34.)  It also does not
contest his argument against the prosecutor’s assertion below – that this evidence was relevant to
show Mr. Jeske’s identity – was not a valid basis to admit this evidence because Mr. Jeske’s
identity was not in dispute.  (See generally Resp. Br., pp.28-34.)
Rather, the State contends that the issue of res gestae was not argued below or used by
the district court in admitting that evidence, and that its decision to admit that evidence was not
problematic under I.R.E. 404(b). (Resp. Br., pp.31-34.)  Both those arguments are mistaken.  The
first is contrary to the actual words the district court used and misreads the decision in
State v. Kralovec, 161 Idaho 569 (2017).  The second is based on an argument which was not
presented below, and which, if considered on appeal, it is based on a misunderstanding of the
scope of I.R.E. 404(b) and of the facts of this case.
A. The District Court’s Actual Words Reveal It Was Using A Res Gestae Analysis, Not The
Analysis Required By I.R.E. 404(b), In Deciding To Admit The Evidence Regarding The
Invalid Status Of Mr. Jeske’s Driver’s License
The appellate court’s review of a district court’s decision looks at the words the district
court actually uses in making that decision. See, e.g., State v. Van Komen, 160 Idaho 534, 540
(2016) (reversing a decision by the district court based on the law relevant to the analysis
reflected in the district  court’s actual words,  and not the law relevant to an analysis the district
court  might  have  otherwise  properly  used  to  reach  the  same  result).   Thus,  while  the  State  is
discretion. See Hedger, 115 Idaho at 600.  The analysis within that two-prong test is, of course,
de novo on  the  first  prong  and  abuse  of  discretion  on  the  second. See, e.g., State v. Joy, 155
Idaho 1, 6 (2013).
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correct that the parties did not argue res gestae, the district court’s actual decision nevertheless
reveals it was using a res gestae analysis to admit the driver’s license evidence:  “that it is
sufficiently intertwined with other issues.”  (Tr., Vol.2, p.24, Ls.14-15.)  The idea that uncharged
conduct is admissible because it is “sufficiently intertwined” with other relevant issues is a res
gestae concept. See Kralovec, 161 Idaho at 573 (defining the concept of res gestae).11  Since the
actual words in the district court’s decision show it was using a res gestae analysis, it is proper to
evaluate its decision in light of the rules in that regard even though the district court did not
formally identify it as a res gestae analysis. See, e.g., Kolar v. Cassia County, Idaho, 142 Idaho
346, 354 (2005) (noting the difference between issues which were not formally raised below and
those which never surfaced below).
The rule applicable to the analysis the district court actually used provides:  “evidence
previously considered admissible as res gestae is only admissible if it meets the criteria
established by the Idaho Rules of Evidence.” Kralovec, 161 Idaho at 574.  The State contends
that Kralovec should only apply to the hearsay rules of admissibility because the res gestae
doctrine originally developed to deal with hearsay statements.  (Resp. Br., p.31-32 (“the issue in
this case has nothing to do with hearsay or its exceptions. . . . The holding in Kralovec is simply
inapplicable  to  this  case.”).)   That  is  an  overly-narrow  reading  of  that  rule  which  is  belied  by
Kralovec itself.
11 Whether or not the definition of res gestae originally came from the district court (see Resp.
Br., 31) is irrelevant because the opinion in Kralovec was clear that the district court’s analysis in
that regard “was sound.” Kralovec, 161 Idaho 573.  As such, the Supreme Court effectively
adopted the district court’s definition and its discussion of the issue indicates it was operating
under that definition when making its decision. See Clinton, 155 Idaho at 272 n.1 (reiterating
that the Supreme Court can accept or reject a lower court’s analysis when it rules on an issue).
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The evidence at issue in Kralovec was the defendant cursing, insulting, and threatening
an officer. Kralovec, 161 Idaho at 571.  As statements by a party opponent, that evidence would
not have been barred by the hearsay rules. See I.R.E. 801(d)(2)(A).  And yet, even though that
evidence would have been admissible under hearsay rules, the Kralovec Court still held that
evidence was not admissible just because it occurred in close temporal proximity to, and was
intertwined with, the charged conduct. Id.  It then proceeded to examine whether that evidence
met the admission criteria set forth in I.R.E. 404(b). Id.  Thus, the rule from Kralovec is broad,
requiring the courts to look at all the applicable criteria for admission established in all the Rules
of Evidence, not just the hearsay rules. See id.
Like the evidence in Kralovec, the evidence about the status of Mr. Jeske’s driver’s
license would only be admissible if it passed muster under I.R.E. 404(b).  However, since the
district court admitted that evidence solely based on it being intertwined with other issues rather
than actually conducting the analysis required by I.R.E. 404(b), its decision constituted an
abuse of discretion. See State v. Parker, 157 Idaho 132, 139 (2014) (holding that the district
court abused its discretion by failing to actually conduct the balancing test required under
I.R.E. 404(b)); State v. Ruiz, 150 Idaho 469, 471 (2002) (same).
B. The State’s Argument For Relevance Under I.R.E. 404(b) Was Not Raised Below
Despite the district court’s failure to engage in the proper analysis on this issue, the State
contends that this Court should nevertheless affirm that decision under the criteria of
admissibility set forth in I.R.E. 404(b).  (Resp. Br., pp.32-33.)  Specifically, it argues the portion
of  the  video  in  which  the  status  of  Mr.  Jeske’s  driver’s  license  was  mentioned  was  relevant  to
whether Mr. Jeske’s alleged impairment was noticeable or perceptible.  (See Resp.
Br., pp.32-33.)  That argument was not made or ruled on below. Compare Kralovec, 161 Idaho
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at 574 (noting that the district court had specifically made an alternative ruling of admissibility
under I.R.E. 404(b) upon which it could affirm the admission of that evidence).
Rather, the prosecutor below argued the status of Mr. Jeske’s driver’s license was
relevant only to the question of Mr. Jeske’s identity.  (Tr., Vol.2, p.18, Ls.1-24.)  The district
court did not discuss the I.R.E. 404(b) criteria at all.  (See generally Tr., Vol.2, p.24, Ls.10-17.)
Since the argument – that the evidence depicting the discussion about status of Mr. Jeske’s
driver’s license was relevant to whether he was perceptibly impaired – never surfaced below, this
Court should not consider it for the first time on appeal. See, e.g., Garcia-Rodriguez, 396 P.3d at
705; Kolar, 142 Idaho at 354.
C. The  Evidence  About  The  Status  Of  Mr.  Jeske’s  Driver’s  License  Was  Not  Admissible
Under Either Criteria Set Forth In I.R.E. 404(b)
Even  if  this  Court  does  consider  the  State’s  new  argument  on  appeal,  that  argument  is
meritless because it is based on a mistaken understanding of the scope of I.R.E 404(b) and the
facts of this case.  Specifically, the State asserts that, because “driving without a license does
not establish a propensity to drive under the influence[,] Rule 404(b) is simply inapplicable.”
(Resp. Br., p.33.)  The scope of that rule is not so narrow.  Rather, I.R.E. 404(b) is concerned
that the jurors will forego their primary duty to consider guilt or innocence based on the evidence
regarding the charged conduct and will simply convict the defendant based on propensity
evidence showing the defendant is a person with a generally-bad character. State v. Grist, 147
Idaho 49, 52 (2009) (quoting State v. Wrenn, 99 Idaho 506, 510 (1978)).  Thus, improper
propensity evidence can speak to the propensity to act in accordance with any character trait, not
just the propensity to commit the charged conduct specifically. See id.; see generally
I.R.E. 404(b).
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For example, testimony regarding the defendant’s attempted rape on a person was “likely
inadmissible under Rule 404(b)” in a case where the defendant was charged with burglary and
robbery. Bias v. State, 159 Idaho 696, 704 (Ct. App. 2015).  Like in Mr. Jeske’s case, there was
no indication that the act of attempted rape would establish a propensity to commit burglary and
robbery. See id.  Nevertheless, the evidence about the attempted rape was problematic because it
spoke to the defendant’s lawless character and his propensity to act in accordance with that
lawless character. See id.  Essentially, it encouraged the jurors to disregard their reasonable
doubts about the evidence regarding the charged offenses and convict him on the idea that, since
he broke the law before, he must have broken the law this time too. See id.; cf. Grist, 147 Idaho
at 52.  Thus, it was the fact that the propensity evidence was not related to the charged conduct
that made it improper under I.R.E. 404(b). See id.
As a result, far from proving the driver’s license evidence in Mr. Jeske’s case was
admissible under I.R.E. 404(b), the State’s argument actually demonstrates why that evidence is
inadmissible, as it effectively concedes the evidence about the status of Mr. Jeske’s driver’s
license was not relevant to any material, disputed issue in this case. See Wrenn, 99 Idaho at 510
(holding propensity was not probative to a non-propensity purpose because it “was in no way
linked to, or connected with, the crime with which [the defendants] stood charged”).
Furthermore,  the  State’s  argument  that  the  video  was  relevant  to  show  the  impairment
was noticeable or perceptible does not really address the question at issue.  Mr. Jeske objected to
the presentation of evidence about the status of his license.  (Tr., Vol.2, p.14, Ls.5-10.)  Besides
the video depicting that discussion, the officer also testified about the status of Mr. Jeske’s
license.  (Tr., Vol.4, p.64, Ls.17-24.)  Therefore, even if the video were relevant, the State’s
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argument to that point still fails to show that the district court’s decision, which allowed evidence
about the status of his license in, was not erroneous.
Besides, the video does not actually bear out the State’s assertion of relevance.  During
the portion of the video when the status of Mr. Jeske’s license was discussed, Mr. Jeske is sitting
in  the  car,  either  in  the  dark  or  facing  away  from  the  camera,  or  is  off-screen  altogether.
(See Trial Exhibit 1, Clip 1068014, 2:00-5:00.)  Since that portion of the video does not actually
show  much  in  terms  of  Mr.  Jeske’s  behavior  or  reactions,  that  portion  of  the  video  is  not
particularly probative as to whether Mr. Jeske’s alleged impairment was noticeable or
perceptible.  (See also App. Br., p.15 (discussing various points where the district court
disagreed  with  the  officer  as  to  whether  the  video  showed  certain  signs  of  impairment).)
Because  that  evidence  was  not  relevant  to  a  non-propensity  purpose,  it  did  not  meet  the  first
criteria of admission established in I.R.E. 404(b).
Furthermore, whatever minimal probative value that portion of the video might have had
was substantially outweighed by the risk of undue prejudice cause by the statements made during
that portion of the video.  The evidence the State presented in terms of whether the impairment
was noticeable or perceptible was subject to several reasonable doubts.  (See App. Br., p.15.)
Therefore,  there  was  a  substantial  risk  that  the  jury  would  disregard  similar  reasonable  doubts
about the evidence of the charged offense and convict Mr. Jeske on the idea that, because he had
not purchased a driver’s license, he must have disregarded the DUI rules, too. Compare, e.g.,
Wrenn, 99 Idaho at 510-11 (explaining that, because the other acts evidence was not related to or
connected with the crime charged, the risk of this type of prejudice was substantial, particularly
when the evidence actually speaking to the charged offense is weak.)
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This risk of undue prejudice is particularly prominent in this case because of the State’s
efforts (which, as discussed in Section I, supra, were, at times, improper efforts) to present other
evidence of Mr. Jeske disregarding rules by refusing to take statutorily-required tests.  Because
that risk of undue prejudice substantially outweighed whatever minimal probative value this
evidence may have had, this evidence fails to meet the second criteria of admissibility under
I.R.E. 404(b) as well.
D. The  State  Did  Not  Argue  Under  The  Proper  Standard  For  Harmless  Error,  And  So,  It
Failed To Meet Its Burden To Prove This Error Harmless
Finally, the State has failed to carry its burden to prove this error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.  As before, the State argues that, because the other evidence presented could
support the verdict, including the evidence only relevant to the per se theory, this error was
harmless.  (See Resp. Br., pp.33-34.)  As discussed in Section I(C), supra, such arguments have
been deemed improper by the United States Supreme Court. See Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 279
(explaining that the question is not whether, absent the error, there is sufficient evidence upon
which to find guilt; the question is whether the verdict actually rendered in this trial was “surely
unattributable” to this error); accord Perry, 150 Idaho at 227 (same); see also Luke, 134 Idaho at
301 (holding that, where one of two potential analyses the jurors could have used is improper,
the case must be remanded for a new trial).
Since, as discussed in Section IV(C), supra,  there  is  a  reasonable  possibility  that  the
jurors disregarded their reasonable doubts about the evidence of the crime charged and convicted
Mr. Jeske based on his propensity to disregard the rules instead, there is a reasonable possibility
the error in admitting the driver’s license evidence contributed to the verdict this jury actually
rendered in this case.  Therefore, this error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
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V.
The Accumulation Of Errors In This Case Requires Reversal Even If This Court Determines
Them All To Be Individually Harmless
The State’s argument in regard to cumulative error is unremarkable.  As such, Mr. Jeske
simply refers the Court back to page 20 of his Appellant’s Brief.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Jeske respectfully requests that this Court vacate the judgment of conviction and
remand this case for a new trial.
DATED this 25th day of October, 2017.
___________/s/______________
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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